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At least since the late nineteenth century, researchers have sought an explanation
for infantile amnesia (IA)—the lack of autobiographical memories dating from early
childhood—and childhood amnesia (CA), faster forgetting of events up until the age of
about seven. Evidence suggests that IA occurs across altricial species, and a number
of studies using animal models have converged on the hypothesis that maturation of
the hippocampus is an important factor. But why does the hippocampus mature at one
time and not another, and how does that maturation relate to memory? Our hypothesis
is rooted in theories of embodied cognition, and it provides an explanation both for
hippocampal development and the end of IA. Specifically, the onset of locomotion
prompts the alignment of hippocampal place cells and grid cells to the environment,
which in turn facilitates the ontogeny of long-term episodic memory and the end of IA.
That is, because the animal can now reliably discriminate locations, location becomes
a stable cue for memories. Furthermore, as the mode of human locomotion shifts from
crawling to walking, there is an additional shift in the alignment of the hippocampus that
marks the beginning of adult-like episodic memory and the end of CA. Finally, given
a reduction in self-locomotion and exploration with aging, the hypothesis suggests a
partial explanation for cognitive decline with aging.
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Infantile amnesia (IA) is the well-documented phenomenon describing how most people
(including children) explicitly recall little or nothing from the ﬁrst few years of life. It is not
that little is learned. In fact the infant is learning a tremendous amount about bodily control
(Adolph, 1997), language (Bruderer et al., 2015), goals (Sommerville et al., 2005), categories (Smith,
2005), causality (Rakison and Krogh, 2010), and more. But there is a curious lack of episodic,
autobiographical memory. Even in toddlers and young children up to the age of about seven, fewer
episodic memories can be retrieved than would be predicted on the basis of adult rates of forgetting
(Bauer, 2015). That is, in addition to IA, there is childhood amnesia (CA; e.g., Newcombe et al.,
2011) when childhood experiences are forgotten more quickly than would be predicted based on
adult-like memory. We will propose a developmental hypothesis that explains IA and CA using
similar mechanisms.
There is no lack of theories to account for IA and CA. Bauer (2015) reviews these
theories and explicates her Complementary Processes theory. We take that theory as a
starting point, but add what we think is a crucial component based on embodiment, namely,
the onset of locomotion. We will argue that it is the onset of locomotion, ﬁrst crawling
and then walking, that provides the conditions for hippocampal place cell and grid cell
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development, and that in turn allows for long-term storage and
retrieval of autobiographical memories.
BAUER’S COMPLEMENTARY
PROCESSES THEORY
The ﬁrst of the complementary processes (or perhaps better,
complementary explanations) is that infants lack some of the
abilities needed to form episodic memories. For example,
Newcombe (e.g., Balcomb et al., 2011; Newcombe et al., 2014)
propose that infants cannot bind elements of representations
(e.g., time, place, actors, etc.) into events. Howe and Courage
(1997) propose that infants lack a self-concept, and hence cannot
relate memories to the self. Nelson and Fivush (2004) elaborate
on this idea by including, for example, development of processes
that control conversation and narrative structure, as necessary
for the full expression of autobiographical memory. Whereas
these ideas all have some support, we do not view the Howe and
Courage and Nelson and Fivush accounts as central to IA and CA
for the following reason: not just humans, but all altricial species
show a form of IA (Arnold and Spear, 1997). On the assumption
that IA across species is not accidental, we need an explanation
that does not focus on human-centric concepts such as language
and the self.
The second complementary explanation in Bauer’s theory is
that even the episodic memories that infants and toddlers manage
to form are exceptionally vulnerable to forgetting during early
years. Bauer, and others, attribute changes in vulnerability to
forgetting to maturation of the hippocampus. The hippocampus
is a limbic structure located deep within the temporal lobe.
It plays a crucial role in binding the spatial and temporal
characteristics of long-term episodic memories (e.g., Moscovitch
et al., 2006) by coding (or binding) environmental features as an
organism moves through time and space. There is little doubt
that the hippocampus plays a central role in episodic memory,
and there is little doubt that it changes over the course of
development. But why does the hippocampus mature at one time
and not another, and how does that maturation relate tomemory?
We propose an embodied answer to these questions.
CONTRIBUTION OF EMBODIMENT
The Hippocampus and Memory
The primary purpose of the hippocampus seems to be spatial
navigation. Place cells code particular locations (e.g., O’Keefe
and Nadel, 1978); grid cells code spatial relations amongst those
locations (e.g., Hafting et al., 2005; Castro and Aguiar, 2014); and
head direction cells code the current direction of movement (e.g.,
Taube, 1998). Reciprocal connections between the hippocampus
and sensorimotor and emotional cortices, along with Hebbian
learning, then produce the ingredients for episodic memory. That
is, activity in visual and motor areas (for example) are bound
together via the hippocampus which codes the location of the
event, resulting in a speciﬁc memory of an event at a speciﬁc
time and place. As the animal changes location, other place and
grid cells can be used to bind new memories that occur while at
the new location. Thus, the place and grid cells (a) bind together
components of events, (b) protect similar events occurring in
diﬀerent locations from catastrophic interference (because of the
association with diﬀerent places), and (c) provide a location-
based retrieval cue, much as with the mnemonic method of
loci.
However, consider the following: Why would an animal that
cannot engage in self-locomotion need to track location in
the environment? The immature altricial animal is completely
dependent on caretakers for food, warmth, and transportation.
The animal does not explore, and hence there is no need to
track novel locations. The animal does not leave the caretaker, so
there is no need to track the location of the home environment.
Even if the animal were separated from its caretaker, because it
does not yet self-locomote, it could not get back home on its
own. Thus, there is no need for evolution to have engineered
an operating location-tracking mechanism for the animal that
cannot self-locomote.
Tuning the Hippocampus to the
Environment
Furthermore, consider how location-tracking mechanisms,
such as place cells and grid cells, might become tuned to
their environment. One hypothesis is that the tuning comes
about through the consistent correlation amongst several cues
including optic ﬂow, head direction, and proprioception from
self-generated movements. For example, optic ﬂow correlated
with proprioception (a) deﬁnes for the animal how speed of
locomotion translates into change of location, and (b) that
correlation comes to represent what is expected of a stable world
(Campos et al., 1992; Dahl et al., 2013). To help understand
these claims, consider what happens when optic ﬂow and
proprioception are decoupled. One way to do that is by walking
on a treadmill. While on the treadmill, the brain relearns the
correlation so that now proprioception is paired with little ﬂow.
One consequence is that when stepping oﬀ the treadmill there
is a brief period of disorientation during which the visual world
appears to move too fast when one begins to walk (Pelah and
Barlow, 1996). A second example is when sitting in a car at a
red light and the car next to you starts to move, thus generating
peripheral optic ﬂow. A typical response is to slam on the brake
because the peripheral optic ﬂow is interpreted as self-movement.
Consider now the pre-locomotor infant who is carried from
location to location. Because the infant is not constrained to
keep her head pointed in the direction of travel, optic ﬂow, head
direction, and proprioception are for the most part uncorrelated.
Thus, there can be no tuning of the place and grid cells to the
local environment. Again, a commonplace experience may help
to elucidate the idea. Imagine two people navigating to a new
location, for example a driver and a passenger (or two tourists
walking together in a new city, where one has a map and the
other follows). In this situation, the driver is forced to keep her
gaze focused in front, creating optic ﬂow correlated with speed
of locomotion, whereas the passenger engages in conversation
(while looking at the driver), or looks around at the sights. Thus,
for the passenger, there is an inconsistent correlation between
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optic ﬂow, direction of movement, and speed of locomotion
(although eﬀects of active versus passive control must also be
considered, as in Bakdash et al., 2008). The result is that the driver
learns the route, but the passenger does not.
In summary, the pre-locomotor infant does not have the
opportunity to tune his hippocampal place and grid cells to the
environment. Consequently, the system remains immature and
an unreliable contributor to memory. That is, it is diﬃcult for the
infant to associate events with a particular place because places
are not strongly distinguished by spatial codes. Furthermore,
it is diﬃcult to keep track of separate but similar events
experienced in diﬀerent locations (because locations are not
strongly diﬀerentiated), and this lack of diﬀerentiation results in
mutual interference and forgetting of the similar events. Note that
this hypothesis regarding the pre-locomotor infant corresponds
to the ﬁrst of Bauer’s complementary explanations: the infant
is unable to form stable episodic memories. However, rather
than suggesting a cause particular to humans, such as a poorly
developed conception of the self or poor language skills, we
oﬀer a mechanism that might be found in every altricial species,
namely, a lack of opportunity to tune place and grid cells to
the environment, and hence a reduced capability to code the
locations of experienced events.
Now consider the situation as the infant begins to crawl.
She must keep her head pointed toward her goal, and that
generates correlations between optic ﬂow, head direction, and
proprioception. We propose that these stable correlations provide
the opportunities required to establish a stable system of grid
cells linking places. Furthermore, with the advent of crawling,
the infant can explore components of her environment (e.g.,
where the grassy area is relative to the tree; where the kitchen
is relative to the TV) and diﬀerentiate them in terms of their
spatial locations coded through linked grid and place cells. This
system then provides the substrate for coding memories of events
in distinct locations and keeping track of separate but similar
events experienced in diﬀerent locations. With the establishment
of spatial location coding, long-term episodic memory becomes
possible. This component of our hypothesis corresponds to the
second of Bauer’s complementary explanations: vulnerability to
forgetting declines over development.
Re-tuning the Hippocampus
But why is there also CA, that is, continued rapid forgetting
even of events experienced by the self-locomoting infant and
toddler? One possibility is that it just takes a lot of experience
in crawling and exploration to establish a hippocampus with
suﬃcient organization of locations to work with adult-like
eﬃciency. Consider, however, the following: at some point,
the infant transitions from crawling to walking. With that
transition, there is a new pattern of correlations between head
direction, optic ﬂow, and proprioception. The new pattern comes
about because the angle between the head and ground (which
contributes to optic ﬂow) is changed, the pattern of muscles
that produce locomotion and proprioception changes, and the
relation between proprioception and optic ﬂow (e.g., speed of
movement and speed of ﬂow) changes (Adolph and Tamis-
LeMonda, 2014). This changing pattern of information forces a
new organization of grid cells coding the relations between self-
movement and change in location. With that re-organization,
the hard-won episodic memories encoded during the crawling
period become less accessible, that is, they are forgotten at a rate
faster than that of an adult. Furthermore, it is not until walking
and associated exploration are well-established that an adult-
like hippocampal system can be formed, binding the elements of
longer-lasting episodic memories.
Components of this hypothesis are not without precedent;
Rovee-Collier (1996) anticipated at least two parts of the
hypothesis. First, she noted that what infants learn matches their
needs for their current ecological niche. For example, newborns
learn appetitive responses, but not defensive ones. She wrote,
“. . .newborns are motorically incapable of escaping or avoiding
aversive events signaled by cues in the environment. . .Instead,
the newborn’s ﬁrst line of defense is to cry. . .Not surprisingly,
most of the successful examples of aversive conditioning in
infants have been obtained after the age of independent
locomotion. . .” (p. 388). Similarly, we propose that infants are
unlikely to develop functioning place and grid cells before
the onset of “independent locomotion.” Second, she conﬁrms
both experimentally and theoretically the relation between self-
locomotion and learning spatial relations, “. . .once infants are
able to self-locomote. . .their deﬁnition of context seems to
change. Before this time, they know what happens in what place,
but they do not know how to get there. Once they can get there
without being carried, however, they acquire spatial relations
along with their new navigational skills and begin to construct
a cognitive map. . .This is particularly important because once
these diﬀerent places become related to each other, the memories
of events that transpired in those places also become associated
with each other” (p. 393, emphasis in the original). Nonetheless,
Rovee-Collier oﬀers a diﬀerent explanation for IA and CA.
EVIDENCE SPECIFIC TO THE
EMBODIED HYPOTHESIS
The embodied hypothesis is broadly consistent with the basic
facts of IA and CA. Furthermore, by noting the developmental
transitions between crawling and walking, the hypothesis
provides a simpler explanation of continued weak episodic
memory than many other hypotheses. In addition, there are
reports that provide evidence consistent with speciﬁcs of the
hypothesis. What follows is not an exhaustive review of the
literature, but a sampling to illustrate some of the highlights.
Herbert et al. (2007) found that 9-months-old infants who
had begun crawling were able to successfully perform a deferred
imitation task when asked to perform the task in a novel
environment with a similar but unique object. Same aged, but
immobile infants, were not as successful. As Rovee-Collier (1996)
suggests, the mobile infants are better able to associate places with
one another and thus retrieve events learned in one environment
while located in a diﬀerent environment.
The literature also documents important changes in cognition
that accompany the acquisition of self-locomotion (many are
reviewed in Campos et al., 2000). For example, Campos et al.
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(1992) demonstrate how fear of the visual cliﬀ is dependent
on self-locomotion. They explain that it is only after the onset
of self-locomotion that the relation between optic ﬂow and
proprioception comes to deﬁne a stable world. Then, when that
relation is disrupted by the unusual optic ﬂow near a visual cliﬀ,
the infant recognizes a new (and potentially dangerous) type of
environment.
Particularly pertinent to our hypothesis are the ﬁndings
of (Adolph, 1997; Adolph and Tamis-LeMonda, 2014). She
documents changes in cognition associated with the transition
from crawling to walking. For example, after many weeks of
crawling, infants are able to discriminate between slopes that
are safe for crawling and those that are not safe. When the
infant begins to walk, however, that discrimination is lost, and
the toddler must again learn to discriminate between these
slopes. Adolph’s discussion of this result (e.g., pp. 66–68; 125–
126) is consistent with changes in optic ﬂow and proprioception
associated with the transition from crawling to walking.
Bauer et al. (2012) documents how 4-years-old children
(compared to 6- and 8-years-old) are not much better than
chance in remembering the locations of events. Interestingly,
Riggins et al. (2015) uncovered an association between episodic
memory and hippocampal volume for 6-years-old, but not for
4-years-old.
Perhaps most important for our hypothesis, the relation
between grid cell ﬁring and self-locomotion is now clearly
established (at least for rats). Winter et al. (2015) had rats explore
an environment while recording from hippocampal grid cells. In
the active condition, the rats explored the environment through
self-locomotion. In the passive condition, the animal was pulled
through the environment in a clear cart. There were several
important ﬁndings. First, grid cell ﬁring was closely associated
with environmental location of the animal in the active condition,
but was severely degraded or missing in the passive condition.
That is, much like passengers in a car, the rats in the passive
condition were not tracking how they got from one location to the
next. Second, the ﬁring of head direction cells (that provide the
brain with a heading) was not disrupted in the passive condition,
but third, the correlation between oscillations in the theta band
(6–10 Hz) and speed of locomotion was disrupted. The second
and third ﬁndings help to explain the ﬁrst ﬁnding of disorganized
grid cell ﬁring in the passive condition. Namely, while in the
cart, the animal’s head cues the direction of travel. However,
the speed of travel, normally associated with movement of and
proprioception from the animal’s own legs, translated into theta
rhythm, is disrupted. Thus, although there is ﬁring in the theta
range, it is dissociated from speed of movement (now provided
by the cart instead of the animal’s legs), and hence there is a
disruption in signaling of when grid cell boundaries are crossed.
HOW CAN THIS HYPOTHESIS BE
TESTED?
Some predictions can be tested with animal models. For
example, weanling rats can be allowed to explore an open
ﬁeld environment that does or does not contain diﬀerentiating
features. The animals exposed to the diﬀerentiated environment
should form amore diﬀerentiated grid cell system. Then, episodic
memory can be assessed by placing food rewards in speciﬁc
locations in the radial arm maze where the animal can eat
the reward. We predict that rats with diﬀerentiated locomotive
experience will be less likely to return to the empty locations
compared to rats reared in an undiﬀerentiated environment.
Other hypotheses can be tested with human infants (several
of these ideas are identical to those in Campos et al., 1992). For
example, there should be a correlation between age of onset of
crawling (and walking) and performance in episodic memory
tasks. A correlation may also be found across cultures that
diﬀer in child-rearing practices that encourage or discourage
self-locomotion. Similarly, children who have been injured so
that self-locomotion is delayed should show a delay in onset of
episodic memory.
Experimental tests are also possible. Consider the following
test of a counterintuitive prediction (see Table 1). In Phase 1
of the experiment, infants who are still crawling are taught a
task (Task 1). Phase 2 occurs when the infant takes her ﬁrst
steps, but while she is still predominately a crawler. In Phase
2, the infant is tested on Task 1 and learns a new task, Task
2. Phase 3 is scheduled so that the interval between Phases 2
and 3 is the same as the interval between Phases 1 and 2. In
Phase 3, the toddler is tested on Task 2.We predict that the young
infant will do relatively well on the test of Task 1 (at Phase 2)
because she learned it while having a “crawling” hippocampus
and was tested while having a “crawling” hippocampus. However,
when the older child is tested on Task 2 (Phase 3), she should
do less well because Task 2 was learned while the child had a
“crawling” hippocampus, but is tested while she has a “walking”
hippocampus.
DISCUSSION
Although we developed this hypothesis to address IA and CA,
it also suggests a novel explanation for some forms of cognitive
decline with aging. That is, as the body ages, there may be
less self-locomotion and less active exploration. In this case,
hippocampal place and grid cell ﬁring may become dissociated
from the environment, with a resultant decrease in episodic
memory. Prevention of detuning may result from following
the common advice to remain active while aging. Furthermore,
this extension of the hypothesis suggests an explanation for
results reported by Anderson-Hanley et al. (2012). They tested













Task learned Task 1 Task 2
Task tested Task 1 Task 2
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a sample of older adults (average age of 78.8 years) randomly
assigned to ride a stationary bicycle (for 3 months) or the same
bicycle combined with a virtual reality tour simulatingmovement
through the environment. Riding the stationary bicycle with
the virtual tour provided signiﬁcantly more buﬀering against
mild cognitive impairment than riding the stationary bicycle
alone. Furthermore, this buﬀering eﬀect was associated with a
greater increase in BDNF, brain-derived neurotrophic growth
factor.
In summary, we have developed a novel explanation for IA
and CA. In brief, when an animal cannot self-locomote, there
is no opportunity for hippocampal place and grid cells to be
tuned to the environment. Consequently, episodic memories
(which require memory for place) are diﬃcult to establish.
The onset of self-locomotion provides the opportunity for
tuning place and grid cells to the environment, and thus the
onset of episodic memory. In humans, however, the change
in mode of locomotion from crawling to walking rewires the
hippocampal cells so that memories created in the crawling phase
are less available, thus providing at least a partial explanation
for IA and a more extended CA. As the animal continues
to explore wider and more diverse areas, a greater number
of hippocampal cells can become tuned to the environment,
thus establishing a mature basis for coding the locations of
remembered events. Unlike some other explanations of IA, this
hypothesis provides an explanation that holds across altricial
species.
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